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Abstract : 
The paper reviews work which draws a link between the dynamics of innovation and the dynamics 
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innovation) and the volatility of firm level stock returns.  By connecting the analysis of risk and 
uncertainty— often left in the finance literature to explanations related to ‘animal spirits’ and other 
stochastic factors— to changes in real production conditions at the firm and industry level, the paper 
provides the foundation for a Schumpetarian analysis of time varying risk.   
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1. Introduction 
The standard approach to industrial economics assumes that innovation is determined 
principally by firm size and the intensity of market competition.  Yet after controlling for the effects of 
industry-specific conditions, empirical studies have found that the intensity of R&D spending is not 
statistically influenced by the size of the firm (Cohen, Leven and Mowery 1987).  Furthermore, ex-
ante and ex-post market power have been found to explain very little of the inter-industry differences 
in innovation (Geroski 1994).   
In fact, most inter-firm differences in innovative activity appear to originate in industry-fixed 
effects related to the characteristics of the underlying technology, for example the conditions of 
technological opportunity, appropriability of innovation, knowledge base conditions (Cohen et al. 
1987).  This has led researchers to investigate inter-industry differences in the sources and 
evolution of innovation, and how these differences evolve over time (Pavitt 1984; Malerba and 
Orsenigo 1996).   
Given the importance of innovation in determining the long-run growth of firms, one should 
expect inter-industry differences in innovation to result in differences in performance.  Much has in 
fact been written on the relationship between innovation and profits (Geroski et al. 1993), and 
innovation and market value (Pakes 1985; Hall et al. 2005).  The current paper reviews recent 
results on the empirical relationship between innovation and the volatility of stock returns asking 
whether inter-industry and inter-firm differences in innovation patterns are translated into inter-
industry and inter-firm differences in the volatility of returns.  Since stock returns are meant to 
capture the dynamics of expected firm growth, the relationship between innovation and stock 
returns provides us with insights regarding the way that innovation dynamics affect expectations 
about future firm growth (i.e. expectations based on fundamentals, bandwagon behavior, irrational 
exuberance etc.).   
In fact, by linking innovation dynamics to stock price dynamics, the paper highlights the 
importance of connecting our understanding of risk and uncertainty— often left in the finance 
literature to explanations related to ‘animal spirits’ and other stochastic factors— to changes in real 
production conditions at the firm and industry level.  It thus provides a foundation for a 
Schumpetarian interpretation of time varying risk.   
2. Innovation as Uncertainty 
Both Frank Knight (1921)—an early pioneer of risk theory—and John Maynard Keynes (1973) 
distinguished risk from uncertainty.  They argued that while a risky event can be evaluated via 
probabilities based on priors (e.g. a lottery), an uncertain event cannot be since a truly uncertain 
situation is “unique”:  
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“The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the 
distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either from calculation a priori or from 
statistics of past experience). While in the case of uncertainty that is not true, the reason being in 
general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high 
degree unique…” (Knight, 1921, p. 232-233)     
“By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain 
from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty…The sense 
in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of 
copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention …. About 
these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.  We 
simply do not know!” (Keynes, 1973, pp. 114-15) 
Both economists used technological innovation as an example of true uncertainty.  Innovation 
is an uncertain process and has uncertain outcomes.  Large investments in R&D often lead to “dry 
holes”. The reasons for the uncertainty behind the innovation process include that: (1) knowledge 
evolves in a tacit non-codifiable manner, embodied in firm-specific capabilities and competencies 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982); (2) innovation is an outcome of the complex, sometimes random 
interaction between firm-specific capabilities and institutions (see discussion of innovation and 
“serendipity” in Nelson 2004); and  (3) radical innovations cause changes to the status quo, 
rendering knowledge in the current period a bad predictor of knowledge in the next period (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986). 
Capitalism, in fact, distinguishes itself from other modes of production such as feudalism by 
the prevalence of technological innovation.  Both Marx and Schumpeter emphasized the central role 
of innovation in the competitive process: competition is not a ballet, as emphasized in neoclassical 
theory (e.g. ‘perfect’ competition), but a fierce battle between firms whose goal is to distinguish 
themselves so to increase market share.  When innovation is “radical” or “competence destroying” 
the economic environment undergoes fundamental change so that current conditions are no longer 
useful for making expectations about the future.  In a similar vein, and building on intuitions found 
Shackle (1955), Davidson (1983) emphasizes how since the very function of entrepreneurs is to 
change the economic environment via “crucial decision making” (strategy in business school talk), 
not only to adapt to it, it does not make sense to model this decision making in a Bayesian manner 
based on priors:  
 “Shackle has developed the principle of cruciality to distinguish situations involving historical time, 
nonergodic worlds from ergodic processes.  When agents make crucial decisions, they necessarily 
destroy any ergodic stochastic processes that may have existed at the point of time of the decision.  
An agent engages in crucial decision-making when the person concerned cannot exclude from his 
mind the possibility that the very act of performing the experiment may destroy forever the 
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circumstances in which the choice is made….In other words, crucial choice involves, by definition, 
situations where the very performance of choice destroys the existing distribution functions. ..the 
future is created by crucial choice decisions, it is not discovered by Bayes-LaPlace theorem. “ 
(Davidson, 1982-83, p. 192) 
That is, the rational expectations hypothesis assumes that information ‘exists’ and agents 
make expectations using this data by calculating probability distributions of actual outcomes today 
and for all future dates.  Yet it is evident that in a capitalist system characterized by constant 
technological change, agents will purposely (and rationally) not use existing information regarding 
the current probability structure since this information is not useful in a dynamic context where 
dynamic refers to the fact that the environment is not static but changing.  If they do, they will make 
persistent errors.  As discussed in Davidson (1982-83), for the rational expectations hypothesis to 
hold, the economy must be ergodic, i.e. stationary and independent of time.  Yet in a world of 
constant technological change, conditions are non-ergodic1.  
If stock prices reflect expectations about (discounted) future profits, then one should expect a 
relationship between innovation—which if successful can have a positive impact on a firm’s profits 
(and growth)—and stock prices.  In particular, during uncertain times, such as those characterized 
by radical innovation and “crucial” decision making, those firms that are seen as both probable 
winners and losers (e.g. the next Microsoft), will experience volatility in their stock prices (Pastor 
and Veronesi 2004).  This is because innovation often causes a shake-up of market shares, 
diminishing the power of the incumbents who have an invested interest in the status quo.  In this 
situation, current performance is not a good indicator of future performance.  In such uncertain 
periods investors are more likely to be influenced by the speculation of other investors, leading to 
“herd effects” and the type of over-reactions emphasized by Campbell and Shiller (1981) in their 
analysis of excess volatility.  In fact, Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) find a strong correlation 
between the volatility of market shares and the volatility of stock prices during early industry 
evolution when technology is uncertain2.  
Notwithstanding the obvious relationship between uncertainty and innovation and how this 
might affect the dynamics of stock prices, there are very few studies which link stock price dynamics 
to innovation.  The rest of the paper provides a review of this work, focusing primarily on work which 
                                                          
1 As discussed in Davidson (1983), an ergodic situation is one where the statistical average of a series (i.e. 
the space averages that refer to a fixed time point) is the same as the time average (i.e. the phase averages 
referring to a fixed point as averages over an indefinite time space.  
 
2 Similarly, Geroski and Mazzucato (2002) find unit roots in firm growth rates during these early uncertain 
periods (and less so when the industry is more stable driven by economies of scale). 
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looks at stock price volatility since it is the volatility of stock prices that captures the dynamics of risk 
and uncertainty tied to innovation.  
3. Some Empirical Work on Stock Prices and Innovation 
There is a missing link between the industrial economics literature on innovation and 
uncertainty and the finance literature on risk and the volatility of stock prices.  There are, however, 
various studies that focus on the effect of innovation on the level of stock prices.  These come 
principally from the applied industrial economics literature that model growth, innovation and stock 
prices over the industry life-cycle (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994; Jovanovic and Greenwood 
1999; Mazzucato and Semmler 1999) and the work on market values and patents (Pakes 1985; 
Griliches, Hall and Pakes 1991; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005 from now on HJT). 
For example, Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) make predictions concerning the evolution of 
the average industry stock price level around the “shakeout” period of the industry life-cycle.  
Focusing on the US tire industry, they build a model which assumes that an industry is born as a 
result of a basic invention and that the shakeout occurs as a result of one major refinement to that 
invention.3  They predict that just before the shakeout occurs the average stock price will fall 
because the new innovation precipitates a fall in product price which is bad news for incumbents.  
Building on this work, Jovanovic and Greenwood (1999) also link stock prices to innovation by 
developing a model in which innovation causes new capital to destroy old capital (with a lag). Since 
it is primarily incumbents who are initially quoted on the stock market, innovations by new start-ups 
cause the stock market to decline immediately since rational investors with perfect foresight foresee 
the future damage to old capital (competence destroying innovations in the words of Tushman and 
Anderson 1986).  Hence the authors claim that the drop in market value of IT firms in the 1970’s 
was due to the upcoming IT revolution (in the 1990’s).   
Interestingly, in both of these papers, it is assumed that agents make expectations through 
Bayesian updating, which can only occur in an ergodic situation where current information is useful 
for making predictions about the future.  Yet, as discussed above, it is precisely in situations 
characterized by innovation and “crucial decision making” by entrepreneurs that current probability 
structures are least useful.   
Another body of literature that connects stock price levels to innovation is that on the 
relationship between market values and patents (Pakes 1985; Griliches, Hall and Pakes 1991).  
                                                          
3 They admit that this is a strong assumption but motivate it through the fact that a single shakeout is typical 
in the Gort and Klepper (1982) data and that particularly in the US tire industry there seems to have been 
one major invention, the Banbury mixer in 1916, which caused the shakeout to occur (Jovanovic and 
MacDonald, 1994, p. 324-325).  
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Pakes (1985) starts with the presupposition that looking at patents and stock prices is a way to 
better understand the relationship between inducements to engage in inventive activity, the 
relationship between inventive inputs and outputs, and the effects of those outputs.  The reasoning 
is that if patent statistics contain information about shifts in technological opportunities, then they 
should be correlated with current changes in market value since market values are driven by the 
expectations about future growth.  Hence the question investigated is to what degree the stock 
market valuation of a firm is good proxy for inventive output (Pakes 1985).  To do so, he 
investigates the relationship between the number of successful patent application of firms 
(unweighted by citations), a measure of the firm’s investment in inventive activity (R&D 
expenditure), and an indicator of its inventive output (stock market value of the firm)4.  He finds that 
indeed unexpected changes in patents and R&D are associated with large changes in the market 
value of a firm. Yet there is a large variance to the increases in the value of the firm that are 
associated with a given patent. This is most likely due to the skewed distribution of the value of 
patents that has been found in the innovation literature. 
Griliches, Hall and Pakes (2001) make use of patent citation data to account for this large 
variance in the value of patents (as explained below, citations are an indicator of value/contribution 
as with academic publications).  This study finds that while a reasonable fraction of the variance of 
market value can be explained by  R&D spending and/or the stock of R&D, patents are informative 
above and beyond R&D, only when citation weighted patents are used (unweighted patent 
numbers are less significant).  Using a Tobin q equation, they find a significant relationship 
between citation-weighted patent stocks and the market value of firms where market value 
increases with citation intensity, at an increasing rate.  The market premium associated with 
citations is found to be due mostly to the high valuation of the upper tail of cited patents (as 
opposed to a smoother increase in value as citation intensity increases)5.   
 
While these papers provide some extremely useful insights on the relation between the market 
valuation process and innovation, they focus on the level of stock prices not on the volatility of stock 
                                                          
4 The logic is clearly stated by Pakes: “The assumptions that management chooses an R&D program to 
maximize the expected discounted value of the net cash flows from the firm’s activities, that the stock market 
measures this expectation subject to error, and that patents are an error-ridden measure of current and past 
values of the inputs to and the outputs from the firm’s R&D activity were used to suggest a testable 
interpretation of the dynamic relationships among the three observable variables”. (Pakes 1985, p. 406).  
 
5 That is, after controlling for R&D and the unweighted stock of patents, they find no difference in value 
between firms whose patents have no citations, and those firms whose patent portfolio has approximately 
the median number of citations per patent.  There is, however, a significant increase in value associated with 
having above-median citation intensity, and a substantial value premium associated with having a citation 
intensity in the upper quartile of the distribution (HJT 2001). 
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prices6.  Yet it is the volatility, not the level, of stock prices that reflects the dynamics of risk and 
uncertainty.   
One well known study that links stock price volatility to innovation is Shiller (2000), where it is 
shown that ‘excess volatility’, the degree to which stock prices are more volatile than the present 
value of discounted future dividends (i.e. the underlying fundamentals that they are supposed to be 
tracking according to the efficient market model), peaks precisely during the second and third 
industrial revolutions.  Figure 1 (from Shiller 2000) indicates that prices peaked in relation to 
earnings precisely during the second and third industrial revolutions.   
Figure 1  the relation between excess volatility and technological revolutions 
(source: Shiller, 2000) 
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Shiller’s work on the excess volatility of stock prices emphasizes the role of herd effects, 
bandwagon effects and animal spirits in agents behavior.  That is, he suggests that it is precisely in 
                                                          
6 Nevertheless, the level and volatility of stock prices are related, e.g. via a “leverage effect”: a firm’s stock 
price decline raises the firm’s financial leverage, resulting in an increase in the volatility of equity (Black, 
1976; Christie, 1982).  The relation between level and volatility is also captured by studies of time-varying 
risk premia which argue that a forecasted increase in return volatility results in an increase in required 
expected future stock returns and thus an immediate stock price decline (Pindyk, 1984 and others reviewed 
in Duffie, 1995). 
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uncertain situations such as those characterized by radical technological change, that current 
information about ‘fundamentals’ (i.e.  current profits, dividends etc.) are less useful for making 
predictions about future market values.  Hence the reason that the volatility of actual stock prices 
are so different from those that would emerge from the efficient market model (and the CAPM) is 
due to the fact that agents make use of other strategies to form expectations about the future under 
those situations (e.g. copying others).  Although Shiller’s work is complementary to that of 
economists who emphases the non-ergodic characteristics of the economy, and hence its lack of 
compatibility with rational expectations (Davidson 1983), Shiller for the most part does not question 
the behavioral foundations of the theory, focusing mainly on implications of the empirical dynamics.   
Shiller’s study uses aggregate data.  Uncertainty, however, is better studied at the 
microeconomic level, as this allows it to be related to the firm’s environment.  The fact that most 
shocks are idiosyncratic to the firm or plant makes this imperative (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992). 
For this reason, Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) and Mazzucato (2002; 2003) study the relationship 
between innovation and stock price volatility at the firm level over the industry life-cycle when the 
characteristics of innovation are changing (Gort and Klepper 1982)  These studies (focused on the 
auto and computer industries) find that both idiosyncratic risk and excess volatility were highest 
precisely during the periods in which innovation was the most radical and market shares the most 
unstable.  “Excess volatility” is measured here following the method used in Shiller (1981), i.e. the 
difference between the standard deviation of actual stock prices (vt below) and “efficient market 
prices” (v*t):      
*
ttt vEv =    and 
∏∑
=
+
∞
=
+=
k
j
jt
k
ktt Dv
00
* γ  
where *tv is the ex-post rational or perfect-foresight price (expected value of discounted future 
dividends), ktD + is the dividend stream, jt+γ is a real discount factor equal to )1/(1 jtr ++ , and jtr + is 
the short (one-period) rate of discount at time t+j.  
Figures 2-3 below (from Mazzucato, 2002) plots excess volatility over time:  the difference 
between the standard deviation of actual stock prices (vt) and the efficient market prices (vt*).  The 
difference between the two lines is greatest in both industries during the periods in which innovation 
was the most radical: the early 20th century in the case of autos, and  the early 1990’s in the case of 
PCs7.  In the latter case, Bresnahan and Greenstein (1997) attribute the higher degree of 
                                                          
7 In Mazzucato (2002), radical innovation is measured through a quality change index (derived by dividing 
hedonic prices in both industries by BEA actual prices, a method used in Filson 2001), as well as through the 
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competitive innovation in this third decade of the PC industry to the “vertically disintegrated” 
structure of innovation—spread out between the makers of the PCs (e.g. Dell), the makers of 
microprocessors (e.g. Intel), the makers of the operating systems (e.g. Microsoft), and the makers of 
application software (e.g. Lotus).  From 1980-1988, innovation in the PC industry was more of the 
“competence-enhancing” type (Tushman and Anderson 1986): it served to enhance the existing 
competencies and lead of IBM.  From 1989-1996, innovation in the PC industry was of the 
“competence-destroying” type: new radical innovations destroyed the lead of IBM.   
The exercise above suggests that it is precisely in periods of “crucial decision making”, as 
emphasized by Shackle (1955) and Davidson (1983), that the efficient market hypothesis will fail to 
predict the volatility of stock prices.  Yet it does not mean that in the absence of such radical change 
the EMM will work.  What we argue is that it will fail the most under those conditions, and hence 
excess volatility will be highest precisely in periods of radical change.  One could argue that even in 
the situation of relative stability the theory will fail.  This is due to other criticisms of the Bayesian-
LaPlace assumptions regarding expectations formation (see Marengo, 1996). 
 4. Idiosyncratic Risk: Sectoral Taxonomies and Stock Prices?  
A recent study by Mazzucato and Tancioni (2005a) asks whether these results can be 
generalized to many different sectors.  That is, do sectors with different innovation dynamics have 
different patterns of stock price volatility?  To analyze inter-sectoral differences in innovation, we 
make use of the sectoral taxonomy of innovation literature (Pavitt 1984; Marsili 2001) as well as the 
industry life-cycle literature (Gort and Klepper 1982).  Since innovation tends to be more radical 
during early industry evolution where there are more technological opportunities available, a 
testable hypothesis is whether idiosyncratic risk is in fact higher in new and/or high-tech industries, 
such as biotechnology.  We focus on “idiosyncratic risk” (rather than excess volatility), i.e. the ratio 
between the returns volatility of a particular firm (or industry) and that of the general market, due to 
its ability to capture firm and industry specific volatility.  The term idiosyncratic here is used in an 
objective not a subjective sense, i.e. it is not referring to how an investor “perceives” risk but simply 
to the empirical difference between volatility at the firm or industry level and the volatility at the 
market level.  In the firm level analysis we will test whether this variable is related to R&D dynamics 
(i.e. whether it is highest when R&D intensity is highest).  We abstain from making any theoretical 
assumptions on where idiosyncratic risk originates8.     
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
more qualitative information provided in industry case studies (case study for autos: Abernathy et al. 1983; 
case study for PCs: Bresnahan and Greenstein 1997).    
 
8 Future research may be dedicated to linking the study of idiosyncratic risk more closely with the (post-
keynesian) discussion of non-ergodicity in financial markets, and the impact of this on macroeconomic policy.   
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Figure 2 
Figure 3 
Standard Deviation of Actual Stock Price and EMM Price in the PC Industry
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First some words on a recent benchmark study on idiosyncratic risk.  Campbell 
et al. (2000) conduct an empirical study of idiosyncratic risk on firm level and industry 
level data.  Their aim is to test whether idiosyncratic risk has increased over time due 
to the IT revolution (and some abstract notion of the New Economy)—an implication 
often found in both academic studies and the popular business media.  They use high-
frequency time series data on daily stock returns for the general market (S&P500), 
industries and firms for the period 1963-19979.  Volatility is measured through the 
sample’s variance calculated on a monthly base.  While the industry level results are 
inconclusive, the firm level results confirm the hypothesis of increased idiosyncratic 
risk.  Specifically, their main findings are: 
I. evidence of a positive deterministic time trend in stock return variances for 
individual firms; no such evidence for market and industry return variances; 
 
II. evidence of declining correlations among individual stock returns in the past 
decades10; 
 
III. volatility moves counter-cyclically and tends to lead variations in GDP. 
 
In the conclusion of their study, Campbell et al offer various explanations of why 
idiosyncratic risk might have increased; (i) companies have begun to issue stock 
earlier in their life cycle when there is more uncertainty about future profits; (ii) 
leverage effects; (iii) improved information about future cash flows due to IT revolution; 
(iv) improved information via financial innovation (new derivative markets).  The 
authors spend some time reviewing the inconclusive evidence on the empirical validity 
of these effects as well as their inconclusive causation.  For example, while improved 
information might increase the volatility of stock price level, it should (at least in the 
case of constant discount rates) decrease the volatility of stock returns since it allows 
news to arrive earlier when cash flows are more heavily discounted.    
Following Campbell et al. (2000), Mazzucato and Tancioni (2005a) study 
idiosyncratic risk across different industries and firms.  Our aim is to test whether more 
innovative industries and firms are characterized by higher idiosyncratic risk 
(regardless of whether it is a New Economy period or not).   At the industry level, we 
study the aggregate behavior of returns in 34 industries using quarterly returns data 
                                                          
9 Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the ratio between the volatility of firm-level returns over the 
volatility of market level returns volatility. The volatility of returns is obtained employing firm-
level monthly information for calculating the standard deviations at the annual frequency. 
 
10 Evidence for (II) is found in the fact that the R sq. for the CAPM market model estimation have 
declined accordingly. 
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from1976-1999 (list of industries is found in Table 1).  At the firm level, we study the 
behavior of monthly firm level returns and quarterly firm level R&D intensity in five 
industries from 1974-2003 (in order from lowest to highest R&D intensity: agriculture, 
textiles, pharmaceutical, computers and biotechnology). 
Table 1: Industry level stock returns, descriptive statistics 
Industry  Mean  Std. Dev. Corr SP500 Industry  Mean  Std. Dev. Corr SP500
AEROSP. DEFENCE 0.118 0.132 0.722 INSURANCE PROPERTY 0.129 0.099 0.685
ALLUMINIUM 0.077 0.117 0.531 INTEGR. DOMESTICS 0.198 0.111 0.621
AUTOMOBILES 0.079 0.129 0.551 METAL AND GLASS CONF. 0.059 0.092 0.582
BANKS 0.068 0.126 0.750 NAT. GAS PIPELINES 0.151 0.135 0.453
BREWERS AND ALCOOL 0.071 0.096 0.705 PAPER CONFECT 0.178 0.139 0.761
BUILD. MATERIALS 0.065 0.128 0.686 PAPER FOREST 0.173 0.114 0.747
CHEMICALS AND COAL 0.070 0.101 0.816 PUBLIC UTILITIES 0.084 0.064 0.681
COMPOSITE OIL 0.229 0.117 0.719 PUBLISHING FOREST 0.309 0.184 0.785
DEPT. STORE RETAIL 0.178 0.147 0.802 PUBLISHING NEWSP. 0.054 0.109 0.712
ELECRICAL EQUIPMENT 0.238 0.131 0.865 RESTAURANTS 0.050 0.106 0.669
ELECTRIC POWER COMP. 0.040 0.128 0.646 RETAIL COMP. 0.067 0.116 0.569
ELECTRONIC INSTR. 0.051 0.066 0.459 SEMICONDUCTORS 0.042 0.233 0.309
ENTERTAINMENT 0.114 0.118 0.692 SOFT DRINKS NON ALC. 0.154 0.128 0.792
FINANCIAL 0.036 0.103 0.809 TOBACCO 0.236 0.205 0.716
FOOD CHAINS RETAIL 0.091 0.099 0.701 TRANSPORT 0.088 0.183 0.323
HOSPITAL SUPPLIES 0.051 0.104 0.716 TRUCKER TRANSP. 0.063 0.126 0.596
INSURANCE MULTILINE 0.045 0.104 0.667 SP500 0.112 0.081 1.000
Sample: 1976q1-1997q3. Source: Standard and Poor’s Analysts Handbooks 
Using information from various sectoral taxonomies of innovation (Pavitt 1984; 
Marsili 2001, EC 1996), the 34 industries in the industry level analysis are divided into 
‘very innovative’, ‘innovative’ and ‘low innovative’. Table 2 contains an example of this 
taxonomy using data from Marsili (2001) on R&D intensity as well as other patent 
related indicators of technological opportunity.  It is important to note that this 
taxonomy is static, i.e. unlike the industry level study in Mazzucato (2002) where the 
focus is how innovation and stock prices evolve over the industry life-cycle, here an 
industry is characterized as either innovative or not innovative during the entire period 
studied.  
Due to the ‘review’ nature of the current article, only the methodology and results 
from Mazzucato and Tancioni (2005a; 2005b) are discussed below. In the first step of 
the analysis, Mazzucato and Tancioni (2005a) develop 34 bivariate VAR 
representations of the industry-level and market-level stock returns, and perform a 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) analysis in order to capture the 
degree of idiosyncratic risk of the series. As long as the expected behavior of profits 
(and/or growth) is more uncertain - and thus volatile - in innovative firms/sectors, we 
expect to find that the percentage of the industry-level predictive error variance is 
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mostly explained by the idiosyncratic shock, i.e. by the industry-specific shock. This 
also implies that the forecast error variance explained by the generic (i.e. SP500) 
shock should be lower in innovative sectors and higher in less innovative sectors11.   
Table 2:  Sectoral Taxonomy of Innovation Intensity (Marsili 2001) 
Intensity of R&D expenditure by sector: time average 1980-1992          Level of technological opportunity by industry in the worlds largest firm
INDUSTRY R&D Product group Factor Rank Rank Rank %
HIGH Aerospace 18.9 R&D int. patent int. FG pat.
Computers 15.5 HIGH Instruments (photo&) 2.2 4 1 2
Pharmaceuticals 11.3 Computers 1.72 2 5 1
Electronics and telecoms 10.8 Pharmaceuticals 1.29 1 3 5
Other transport 8.1 Electrical-electronics 1.19 3 2 3
Instruments 7.2
MED-HIGH Chemicals 0.25 7 4 7
MED-HIGH Motor vehicles 4.4 Motor vehicles 0.18 6 10 4
Chemicals 2.8 Aircraft -0.04 5 7 12
Electrical Machinery 2.7
MEDIUM Rubber -0.4 8 9 10
MEDIUM Non-electrical machinery 1.7 Textiles -0.4 10 11 6
Other manufacturing 1.3 Machinery -0.44 9 6 15
Petroleum 1.3
Building materials 1.2 MED-LOW Building materials -0.56 11 8 13
Rubber and plastics 1.2 Paper and wood -0.67 15 15 8
Non-ferrous metals 0.8 Drink and tobacco -0.81 17 16 9
Metal products 0.6 Other transport -0.85 12 12 16
Ferrous metals 0.5 Food -0.87 14 17 11
Mining and petroleum -0.87 16 13 14
MED-LOW Paper and printing 0.3 Metals -0.92 13 14 17
Food and Tobacco 0.3
Wood and wood products 0.2 Source: Marsili (2001), Table 6.7
Textiles 0.2
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 3.1
source: Marsili (2001), Table 6.2  
In a second step, following the approach developed in Campbell et al (2000), the 
analysis is conducted in the context of the CAPM model.  We pool the industry-level 
sample information obtaining a balanced panel with time dimension T (88 
observations) and sectional dimension N (34 observations), and regress the industry-
level stock returns on industry-specific dummies (Fixed Effects) and the SP500 
returns. This set up allows a test of the efficient market hypothesis and, a test of the 
cross-sectional heterogeneity. In line with the results obtained by Campbell et al. 
(2000), we obtain a measure of the percentage of variability explained by the 
regression. As long as the behavior of stock prices and returns in innovative sectors is 
mostly affected by idiosyncratic factors, the variability explained by the regression 
should result higher for the low innovative industries and lower for the more innovative 
industries.  
                                                          
11 When running the bi-variate VAR the residuals are linear combinations of structural shocks.  
To distinguish between different types of shocks we use a Choleski ordering, entering first the 
industry specific returns variable.  We also check for robustness with respect to other 
orderings and find that the results are not qualitatively different.  
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In the firm-level analysis, the empirical investigation is developed by directly 
testing the existence of a positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and the firm-
level degree of innovativeness, proxied by R&D intensity (R&D expenditures divided 
by sales).  R&D intensity of course only captures innovative effort (innovation input 
rather than output).  But since in the literature on market value and patents, R&D 
intensity has also been found to be highly correlated with both patent counts and 
patent citations (Pakes 1985, Hall et al. 2005) the results should not be overly biased.     
Results prove that the relationship between innovativeness and stock return 
volatility is rather mixed.  In line with the findings found in Campbell et al. (2000), the 
analysis using industry level data suggest that there is no coherent pattern between 
innovation and idiosyncratic risk.  While some of the innovative industries conform to 
the predicted behavior of higher idiosyncratic risk (e.g. semiconductors), other 
innovative ones do not (e.g. aircraft).  The same holds for the low innovative 
industries.  In fact, expectations seem to be only fulfilled in the extremes of the 
categorization (for very innovative industries or for very low innovative industries). 
As in Campbell et al (2000), more clear results concerning idiosyncratic risk 
emerge with firm level data.  Here it is found that firms with the highest R&D intensity 
clearly have the highest idiosyncratic risk.  A positive and contemporaneous 
relationship between idiosyncratic risk and innovation intensity is empirically 
established and this result is robust to model extensions, such as the control for firm 
dimension, and – with the exception of the agricultural industry - to the particular sub-
sample employed. 
Interestingly, the relationship is not found to be stronger for firms in industries 
that are more “innovative”.  We find, for example, that the relationship holds stronger 
for firms in textiles (low-innovative) than for firms in pharmaceuticals (high innovative).  
We hypothesize that this is because the low average R&D intensity in textiles makes 
innovative firms in that industry ‘stick out’, and hence for the reaction (by market 
analysts) to their innovativeness be stronger.  Furthermore, while innovation in a 
mature but innovative industry, like pharma or computers, may be high (expressed 
through a high R&D intensity and/or number of patents), it’s commercial outcome is 
often less uncertain than in new emerging sectors (like biotech and nanotechnology) 
or in old sectors where innovation activity is not intense (textiles), and hence causes 
less of a reaction by market analysts.  Hence, it appears that R&D intensive firms in 
very new industries (e.g. nanotechnology) and very old industries (e.g. textiles), 
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provoke a stronger reaction than R&D intensive firms in innovative mature industries 
(such as pharma).   
Mazzucato and Tancioni (2005a) find that the discrepancy in results obtained 
with the industry and firm-level analyses are not attributable to aggregation biases.  
Instead, the inconclusiveness of the industry level results is mostly attributable to the 
fact that the innovation measure used (the sectoral taxonomy of innovation) is static, 
so that it does not allow consideration of how innovation changes over time, e.g. an 
industry may be highly innovative in one period and less so in another when the life-
cycle becomes mature), or when the knowledge regime changes (e.g. for a discussion 
of the change in knowledge regime from one of “random search” to one of “guided 
search” in the pharmaceutical industry, see Gambardella 1995).   
In fact, as emphasized in Mazzucato (2002;2003), the dynamic structure of this 
relationship is fundamental.  For example, Figures 4-5 illustrate that idiosyncratic risk 
is highest precisely during those decades when innovation in those industries is 
particularly intense: e.g. computers (1989-1997) and biotechnology (1995-2003).     
Figure 4 
Returns volatility: Biotechnology vs. SP500 (1983-2003) 
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Figure 5 
Returns volatility: Computers vs. SP500 (1983-2003) 
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Although in the firm level analysis Mazzucato and Tancioni (2005a) establish the 
existence of a direct link between R&D intensity and volatility, the analysis cannot 
explain the heterogeneity found across industries, only the heterogeneity within 
industries, i.e. at the firm level.  This may be due to the fact that R&D intensity is only 
an indicator of innovative input not output.  Nevertheless, these results represent a 
further step in linking stock price volatility and innovation dynamics at the firm and 
industry level.   
On this basis, and given that it is important to also take into consideration 
innovative output, Mazzucato and Tancioni (2005b) incorporate patent citation data 
into stock price volatility analysis.  Rather than using indirect or input measures of 
innovation as in our previous work (e.g. dividing industries by their level of 
innovativeness using sectoral innovation taxonomies, employing hedonic based 
quality change data or using R&D intensity), we use firm level patent citation data 
which captures the “importance” of an innovation (as in the work discussed above on 
market value and patent citations; Pakes 1985 and HJT 2005).  In a study which 
focuses on firms in the pharma-biotech sector, we find a strong relationship between 
the volatility of stock returns, price-earnings ratios and citation weighted patents.    
 
5. Conclusion 
The studies discussed in this review piece illustrate that the uncertainty inherent 
in the innovation process (Knight 1921; Keynes 1973), is reflected n the dynamic 
behavior of stock price volatility.  Hence, unlike the claim that stock prices are driven 
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primarily by “animal spirits” (and related irrational exuberance), this analysis has shed 
light on how stock price volatility is fundamentally linked to the real (not imaginary) 
structure of technological change during industry evolution.  
The point, however, is not that irrational exuberance isn’t important.  Rather that 
this type of bandwagon behavior is more important in periods of radical change when 
there is greater uncertainty about the future, or in the words of Davidson (1983) in 
periods of “crucial decision making”.  This might be related to the presence of 
information cascades (Bikhchandani, Hishleifer, and Welch, 1992).  An information 
cascade is a situation where investors are influenced by the behavior of other agents, 
leading them to “follow the crowd” rather than using their own private information (e.g. 
on fundamentals).  Information cascades are more likely to occur the less certain each 
individual is about the quality of his or her own information (e.g. in periods of radical 
technological change when no one knows who the next Microsoft will be).  
 Information cascades can cause the social outcome to be history –
dependent, i.e. non-ergodic.  Convergence of behavior to a certain trend can be very 
idiosyncratic and fragile, characterized by short-lived fluctuations: fads, fashions, 
booms and crashes. Information cascades can explain why people will place 
themselves on the borderline between fads so that very small events can cause a 
radical switch in behavior12.  In relation to our discussion on innovation and 
uncertainty, it may be that in the early stage of a new technology, changes in a firm’s 
market share may signal either changes in firm knowledge or a fortuitous shock-- the 
investor does not know.  In other stages, in contrast, the investor knows with almost 
certainty that the change in market shares is a result of a random shock (and hence 
is not a result of changes in fundamentals).  Thus information cascades are more 
likely to happen at early stages of the industry life-cycle. 
 
Our results in fact suggest that such ‘herd’ behavior is not totally random 
since it is more likely to occur during periods of radical innovation (i.e. in the early 
stage of the industry life cycle).  That is, the pricing of a stock differently from its real 
value is more likely to happen in unstable periods when ‘own information’ is less 
reliable and hence herd or cascade behavior is more likely.  This means that we 
                                                          
12 Sequential choices are especially subject to information cascades since previous 
decisions/behavior can get reinforced, notwithstanding any new private information. As long 
as a new  individual’s decisions are drawn independently from the same distribution as that of  
previous individuals, the new individual will also ignore his/her own information and takes the 
same actions as previous individuals (Bikhchandani, Hishleifer, and Welch, 1992). 
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should expect more excess volatility in the beginning of the industry life cycle when 
innovation, output and market shares are much more unstable.   
 
The work reviewed in this paper provides a foundation for a Schumpetarian 
understanding of the relationship between innovation and expectations formation 
under uncertainty.  More theoretical and empirical work needs to be done on the 
dynamic feedback between innovation and uncertainty and the impact of this on the 
market valuation process, i.e. how on the one hand periods of (radical) innovation 
cause the environment to be more uncertain (the focus of most of the papers above) 
and on the other hand how innovation itself would not arise without uncertainty 
(emphasized in the work of Knight)13.  The dynamics of the stock market, and 
emergence of bubbles, is obviously related to both these mechanisms.  
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